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1. Introduction  
While debates on whether international aid has fostered economic development and living 
conditions of developing countries have not ended,2 there is a growing tendency that 
emphasizes technical assistance (TA) —knowledge transfer for economic development (King, 
2004; King and McGrath, 2000; King and McGrath, 2004). However, Korea has not yet 
substantially engaged in TA in an international realm. Since the majority of aid in Korea has 
been allocated to provision of infrastructure and dispatch of volunteering activities to 
recipient countries, TA accounts for a relatively small portion, 7% of the total ODA.  
Measuring the impact of TA programs is much more difficult than the other types of ODA, so 
TA should be managed and conducted more carefully to maximize its effectiveness. Donor 
countries recently underscore the significance of monitoring and evaluation of aid programs 
as reflected in the notion of “managing for results” in the Paris Declaration. In addition to 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, it is necessary to set clear guidelines to make TA 
more effective. Despite the growing attention to TA, it seems that the general and 
comprehensive framework of strategic TA has not yet been firmly established.  
Among many fields of TA, strengthening capacity for better public governance is gaining 
much highlight in recent years in Korea. In a developing country where there is only a 
minimum existence of a private sector, any development drive will not be successful without 
a competent government that makes a right decision at a right time. TA on the public 
governance is, however, relatively more difficult to be successful than other types of TA 
because its success depends on the will of political leaders and bureaucrats of the recipient 
country which is exogenous variable for the donor. On top of that, TA on better governance 
can sometimes include suggestions that may not be welcomed by the bureaucrats of the 
recipient country. 
Therefore, TA on governance should have not only a locally applicable recommendation in 
the consulting paper but a strategically-designed process that can realize the intended changes. 
For that purpose, the donor should consider both the recipient country’s willingness to accept 
the recommendation and her capacity to implement it.3 How should we design TA programs 
to guarantee their maximum effectiveness? The goal of this paper is to provide such guideline 
for TA in the area of public governance.  
This paper uses both inductive and deductive reasoning. For an inductive reasoning, this 
paper reviews Korea’s TA for developing countries to identify problems and rooms for 
improvement in Section 2. For deduction, this paper learns from the field of education 
because TA is similar to teaching and learning process, which will be explained in detailed 
way in Section 3. Another research method of this paper is a case study on the “Capacity 
Building Program for Indonesian government”, which will be covered by Section 4. The 
program, lasted a relatively long 3 years, was designed in a different way from previous cases 
and therefore carries many interesting implications.  
 
2 All the components of TA should be designed, implemented, and evaluated to best serve the impact or the ultimate goal 
(Banathy, 1996), which is the betterment of people’s life. 
3 Korea began to consider the significance of 'policy coherence for development' where the harmonization between 
experiences, interests, and policy context of donor country and those of recipient country (Lee and Kim, 2009).  
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Based on the result of the prior sections, Section 5 will propose some guidelines for TA in 
enhancing public governance of developing countries. Those guidelines, however, will be 
applicable in other fields of TA as well. For a conclusion, Section 6 will suggest some of 
models for international collaboration between donors.  
 
2. Korea’s TA Programs on Governance 
 
Korea is the second country among OECD members that switched her status from an ODA 
recipient to a donor country after Japan. Korea was an ODA recipient for 65 years since her 
independence from Japan but became a member of Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of OECD in 2010. In particular, Korea has promoted its commitment to resolving 
global problems through active ODA programs though still at the early stage.4 
 
During past years,5 the Korean government has expanded not only its ODA budget but also 
diversified and systemized its programs. Recently, the Korean government began to pay 
increasing attention to capacity building programs particularly through supporting 
administrative reform initiatives and improving administrative systems. In fact, it has been 
considered that the development of healthy and effective administrative system is a great 
foundation and often precondition for social and economic development (Jun et. al. 2007). 
Despite its increasing importance, Korea’s TA has much room for improvement both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
2.1 Recent Development 
The volume and its share 
The Korean government is in a unique position to share its development and policy 
experiences with developing countries. Jun and et. al. (2007) particularly highlighted eight 
strategic ODA areas that the Korean government should focus on, which include education, 
public health, administrative institutions, community development, energy, disaster 
management, and environmental management. Among the eight selected areas, the 
establishment of administrative institutions has been most important as the following table 
shows. It suggests that supporting and establishing effective administrative system in 
 
4 In terms of ODA in proportion to Gross National Income (GNI), Sweden, Norway, Luxemburg budgeted more than 1% 
while US, UK, and Germany offered 0.2%, 0.52%, and 0.35%, respectively. Korea offers about 0.1% which placed it at the 
23rd while the average of DAC member countries is about 0.49%. As an emerging donor, Korea has increased its ODA 
budget and played an increasingly important role in the global community. Korea spent about 0.455 billion USD in 2006 and 
increase to 0.812 billion USD in 2009, which is about 0.1 percent of GNI but aims to reach 0.7 percent, UN’s suggested 
guideline, by 2015.  
5 Surprisingly, Korean government began its first TA program in 1965 when the government developed training programs 
for developing countries with its own budget after it conducted contacted training programs with USAID funding in 1963. 
Korea began to send its experts for its own ODA programs, provide ODA to developing countries, which made Korea be 
characterized both as recipient and donor country simultaneously. Korea also established Economic Development 
Cooperation Fund (EDCF) in 1987 to provide loans to developing countries as part of ODA programs. It eventually 
established Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 1991. Being a member of OECD-DAC, Korea also 
established the Basic Legal Framework for ODA in 2010.  
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developing countries has been one of primary areas that Korea has focused in her TA 
programs.  
 
<Table 1: KOICA TA Budget by Field (1991~2010)> 
Amount unit: million KRW 
 Edu. 
Public 
Health 
Adm 
Ins. 
Com 
Dev ICT 
Ind 
Energy 
Env. & 
Others 
Emer 
gency 
Un- 
class Total 
Amount 415,493 453,526 416,405 198,143 268,232 215,968 511,577 150,389 86,126 2,715,859 
% 15.3 16.7 15.3 7.3 9.9 8.0 18.8 5.5 3.2 100 
Source: http://www.koica.go.kr  KOICA Statistics 2010 
Edu.: Education, Adm Ins.: administrative institutions, ComDev: community development, ICT: information and 
communication technology, Indu Energy: Industry and Energy, Env.: environment, Un-class: Unclassified (administrative 
cost and others) 
However, the ratio of TA on governance6 has been fluctuated as the following table shows. 
 
<Table 2: TA Budget for Administrative Institutions and Capacity Building Programs> 
                                                                Amount unit: million KRW     
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
amount 7,247 7,372 21,986 40,717 54,161 27,331 38,478 47,262 43,612 38215 32,313 
% 14.1% 10.6% 28.3% 27.5% 26.6% 12.7% 20.8% 18.8% 14.3% 12.4% 6.2% 
 
Source: KOICA Statistics (2010) 
 
 
Training Programs by Provider 
 
Many government agencies develop their own TA programs as part of international 
collaboration activities. In particular, training and research institutions such as the Central 
Official Training Institute (COTI), Local Government Officials Development Institute 
(LOGODI), KDI and KDI School are active in TA programs under the sponsorship of either 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT). 
COTI has developed its training programs to share Korean economic development 
experiences and enhance competencies of government officials since 1984. COTI has three 
major financial sources of training programs: its own self-funded programs, KOICA-funded 
programs, and programs funded by international organization such as ASEAN government 
official training programs. COTI has trained 2,236 government officials of developing 
countries between 1996 and 2008. As summarized in the figure, both the number of recipient 
countries and the total number of trainees are in its steady rising trend. 
 
6 We consider the category of ‘administrative institutions’ as TA on governance. It should be noted that the ODA 
classification by policy areas (public health, administrative institutions, environment, etc.) is different from the classification 
by ODA nature (project, training, R&D, expert or volunteer dispatch, etc.)  Unfortunately, the statistics on the two 
classifications are independently provided so that that of TA ODA is not clearly calculated. TA ODA seems to be associated 
with the category of ‘administrative institutions’ and the category of ‘non projects (training, expert dispatch, etc.).   
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<Figure 1: COTI's Training Programs for Government Officials > 
 
 
# of Trainees and # of Countries 
Source: COTI’s Internal Information (2010) 
 
LOGODI has also actively operated training programs especially for ‘local’ government 
officials in developing countries. It trained 1,590 foreign government officials from 81 
countries between 1996 and 2010. Just like COTI, LOGODI also has three sources of funding 
their training programs. The major fields are of course local development, New Village 
Movement, local governance, local autonomy, electronic government, HRD.  
<Table 3: Training Programs for Government Officials by LOGODI and KDI(S)> 
 
 Year 
No. of 
Prog. 
Ave. # of 
Trainees Total Year 
No. of 
Prog. 
Ave. # of 
Trainees Total 
LOGODI 
1996 1 15.0 15 2003 6 16.0 90 
1997 1 20.0 20 2004 8 14.3 120 
1998 1 20.0 20 2005 10 15.2 150 
1999 1 14.0 14 2006 10 16.8 150 
2000 3 16.3 45 2007 12 17.0 180 
2001 4 16.8 60 2008 14 19.9 210 
2002 5 16.4 75 2009 11 19.5 165 
KDI 
KDIS 
2005 43 26.4 1137.0 2008 35 30.1 925.5 
2006 42 35.2 1110.6 2009 46 31.5 1216.3 
2007 34 23.4 899.0     
Source: LOGODI’ Internal Information (2010) and KDI's Internal Information (2010) 
 
Korean Development Institute (KDI) and KDI School have also developed various training 
and consulting programs. KDI’s Center for International Development conducts consulting 
programs called Knowledge Sharing Programs (KSP). KDI School’s Development Research 
and Learning Network is working on short-term training, impact analysis, GDLN (Global 
Development Learning Network), and research on Korea’s development experience. 
TA on administrative institution or capacity building is a major area in inbound training 
programs of KOICA, which constitutes 35.1% (93 programs) of total inbound programs. 
Other areas are industry and energy (19.2%) and rural development (8.3%). Between 1991 
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and 2008, there were 1,265 inbound training programs on developing governance capacity. In 
addition to inbound training programs, KOICA has recently begun more extensive project-
based consultation programs for administrative capacity building as the following table 
shows. The Indonesian case will be analyzed in detail in section 4. 
<Table 4: Examples of Consultation Programs> 
 
Country Content 
East Timor Establishment of Postal Service System  
Bangladesh Capacity Building Program for Senior Government Officials  
Sri Lanka Local Government Capacity Building for Emergency Management  
Indonesia Capacity Building Program (1st and 2nd  Phase)  
Cambodia Land Management Basic Plan Support Program  
Colombia Action Plan Support Program on Informatization 
Source: Compiled from KOICA Homepage  
 
2. 2 Issues and Problems   
 
This section will briefly summarize major characteristics of current Korean TA programs are 
briefly examined and some suggestions are offered below.  
First, Korea’s TA is only a small fraction of all ODA budget. Currently, dominant 63.6% of 
the KOICA ODA budget is used for construction of schools, hospitals, electronic system, etc. 
Dispatch of volunteers follows with 12% (KOICA, 2011). The budget for training comes the 
third with only 7%. Considering the growing need of TA, this low ratio should be enhanced. 
Second, TA heavily relies on inbound training programs. The budget for training programs is 
7% of the KOICA ODA budget. Only 0.3% of the KOICA ODA budget was allocated for 
expert dispatch. KOICA had 82 inbound training programs in 1991 and increased them to 
513 programs in 2008. While the inbound training programs provide the government officials 
of developing countries with a chance to see Korea, they tend to be one time quick learning 
program rather than sustainable capacity building programs. Since most of inbound training 
programs are also lecture-based sessions rather than activity-based, trainees cannot easily 
internalize acquired policy knowledge. To deal with these shortcomings of current short-term 
inbound training programs, Korean government needs to develop more on-site consultation 
projects strategically combined training programs. This allows trainees to apply what they 
learned into practice and to build their own administrative capacity.   
Third, TA is generally short-term based, rather than long-term. Many inbound training 
programs are often less than two-week long. These programs offer government officials of 
developing countries a good opportunity to learn basics of targeted areas, but they are not 
enough to cover more specialized subjects. A common feedback from the first time trainees is 
that they find the training program very useful but want to have more advanced level 
trainings in another opportunity. Along with short-term training programs, Korean 
government should develop more diverse programs in terms of training period of time (one-
month long, three month-long, half year and one-year. long-term training programs) 
depending on the nature of targeted training areas and training objectives. In case of 
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consultation programs, Korea also needs to introduce multi-year projects rather than one-year 
ones since the impact of one-year projects is often very limited and not sustainable in nature.  
Fourth, most of TAs are currently designed and conducted by external contractors. In fact, 
KOICA heavily relies on external experts and collaborative partners even in the roles such as 
a coordinator, fund allocator, monitor, and evaluator due to lack of human resources and 
expertise. While KOICA should continue to build good collaborative relationship with 
external experts and partnering institutions, KOICA should also make efforts to build its own 
capacity to effectively manage increasingly more complex, more diverse, and bigger TA 
programs.  
Fifth, lack of regional experts produces knowledge transfer without local applicability. TA 
cannot be successful without good understanding of political, economic, and social context of 
recipient countries. The lack of local applicability seriously diminishes the effectiveness of 
TA. Unfortunately, there are not many regional experts in Korea because there has been little 
demand for them.  
Six, unlike the other types of ODA which is generally skewed towards Asia,7 TA maintains a 
relative balance between regions. Out of 31,709,000 USD spent for training programs in 2010, 
41% of it was spent for the training programs for the government officials from Asian 
countries followed by those of African countries with 38% share. (KOICA, 2011). This 
balance should be maintained. 
Seven, policy on TA is lacking in coordination. Along with rapid growth of ODA budgets 
and programs in Korea, there have been some overlapped programs among different agencies. 
It has been argued that the lack of coordination among different agencies is critical to the 
efficiency of ODA programs. To resolve these problems, the Korean government has 
established an ODA coordination unit at the Prime Minister’s Office. But the role of the unit 
is still preliminary and self-interested behaviors among agencies and departments still remain. 
In order to enhance the level of efficiency as well as effectiveness, the Korean government 
needs to continue to deal with somehow pathological budget-maximizing behaviors of 
agencies and to coordinate ODA programs initiated by different agencies.  
 
3. Lessons from Education Theory 
3.1 Theoretical Framework: From Capacity to Competency 
Traditional TA programs have focused on the capacity building of developing countries. TA 
has many resemblances with teaching and learning process. Just like effective education is 
attributable both to the provider and consumer of the knowledge, the low effectiveness of TA 
is caused both by the donor and the recipient.  
TA has aimed at strengthening the capacity of a recipient country by transferring necessary 
knowledge and skills which should be phronesis, practical wisdom (Polanyi, 1966). For the 
 
7 The 54.5% of KOICA program budget was allocated to 32 Asian countries while 15% was allocated to 47 African 
countries in 2010 (KOICA, 2011). 
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development of capacity, discovery learning which is a process of making meaning and 
implication from direct experience is vital instructional method (Svoboda, 1977). The 
discovery learning is about creating an experience where learning can be facilitated.  
And while it is the learner's experience that is most important to the learning process, it is 
also important not to forget the wealth of experience that a good facilitator also brings to the 
situation (Bell & Kozlowski, 2007). An effective experiential facilitator is one who is 
passionate about his or her work and is able to immerse participants totally in the learning 
situation, allowing them to gain new knowledge from their peers and the environment created. 
These facilitators stimulate the imagination, keeping participants hooked on the experience. 
In a typical TA situation, the role of facilitators is taken by the experts or consultants. Thus, 
consultants should be good facilitators as well as knowledgeable experts.  
Now, the question is how to design the collaborative efforts of both the recipient and the 
donor to maximize the impact of the TA. Quality of any human endeavor is subject to the 
performers’ capacity and motivation (Noe, 2010). The recipient is generally lacking in not 
only a capacity but also motivation to implement the result of the program. As a result, the 
output of TA is often thrown into the cabinet right after the final presentation conference. The 
donor also does not have motivation to provide an effective TA as well as the capacity to 
offer a knowledge that has local relevance since it values only the act of the knowledge 
provision, not the effectiveness of it. All the possible explanations for either success or failure 
in TA, therefore, boil down to motivation and capacity of both the recipient and the donor.  
The capacity is composed of knowledge and skills, and serves as a potential for performance 
(Rothwell, Hohne, & King, 2007). Motivation on the other hand orients the direction of the 
capacity. For example, individuals who have a capacity may or may not exert efforts toward 
desirable way (Keller, 2010). Therefore, capability (knowledge and skills) is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition without motivation. Without motivation, knowledge and skills in a 
person will not make any changes nor deliver services to people (Keller, 2010). In this regard, 
competency, which is defined as a combination of capacity and ‘motivation’ should be the 
principal target of TA. A competency is what can be “observed in job situation” (Rothwell, 
2000), and emphasize application of capacity to a reality.  
The donor usually has a weak motivation to provide TA implementable by the recipient as 
well. Depending on the donor’s motivation, knowledge and skills accumulated in a recipient 
through discovery learning processes and facilitations may or may not be used for a 
meaningful way.  
Antecedents of motivation are many, including internal characteristics of self-efficacy, locus 
of control, cognitive resonance, and external reinforcer such as incentives (Driscoll, 2004). 
For direct and immediate effect to motivations of civil servants, development of incentive 
system is widely used. Opportunity of promotion, present of punishment, provision of 
financial award, public recognition by the organization could be used for reform-oriented 
incentives to the civil servants. However, abuse of external motivators is known to bring 
detrimental effect on the creativity of individuals and dynamism in organizational culture in 
the long run. It is the responsibility of designers to discern when to use which type of 
motivational systems. Any competency-oriented TA program should be designed to address 
the issue of motivation and capacity of both the recipient and the donor.  
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3.2 Environmental Factors: Transfer-Friendly Work Environment 
Transfer of training, a key concept in adult learning theories, refers to trainees’ effective and 
continuous application of what they learned in training (knowledge, skills, behaviors, 
cognitive strategies) to their jobs (Noe, 2010, p.187). The end goals of training and education 
are not achieved unless transfer takes place (Subedi, 2004), and the same with TA. Despite 
the importance of transfer of training, however, the most commonly cited estimate is that 
only 10% of learning transfers into job performance, and reports from the field suggest that a 
substantial part of organizations' investment in training is wasted due to poor learning transfer.  
Theory of learning transfer constructed by researchers illustrates the multi-dimensional nature 
of transfer mechanism (e.g., Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Noe, 1986). It indicates that the transfer 
of learning is a function of individuals’ competency, work conditions, and organizational 
support. Transfer of training (or lack of it) is a complex process and depends upon the intent 
or motivation of the learner (trainee characteristics), the workplace environment including 
supervisory support (organizational environment and culture), and the instructional design as 
well as delivery features (job relevance) of the training program (Subedi, 2004).  
Among those factors, workplace environment is known as the strongest variable that 
influences individuals’ ability and opportunity to transfer. Workplace environment or 
organizational support includes manager’s and peer’s acceptance of the new knowledge and 
skills earned from training and further reinforcement for application opportunity of them. In 
government organizations, compared to private companies, the relative influence of this 
variable is much greater because of many strict regulations that prevent changes in 
conventional routines.  
Transfer of training has also been classified in terms of ‘near transfer’ and ‘far transfer’.  
The near transfer of skills and knowledge refers to the replication of the previously acquired 
knowledge and skills in all identical situations (Thorndike, 2001). This theory of transfer is 
based on the belief that previous learning facilitates new learning only to the extent that the 
new learning task contains elements identical to those in the previous task (Perkins & 
Salomon, 1996). Far transfer of training, on the other hand, refers to learning new skills or 
performing new tasks in situations that differ significantly from the situations of original 
learning. Training conditions, which focus on far transfer, require learners to adapt the 
acquired knowledge and skills as guidelines to perform or learn in changed situations or new 
environments (Misko, 1999). Thus far transfer goes beyond repetitive application of learned 
behavior and involves cognition and analogy to adapt to new challenges. The far transfer is 
more important than near transfer from the perspectives of TA where knowledge and skills of 
the donors should be transplanted in the different situations of the recipients.  
 
Another environmental factor that is related to governance reform is alignment of what they 
learned in the workplace context. Researchers have contended that the most significant gains 
in transfer will come when learning is more tightly integrated into the process and reward 
systems that already matter in the organization (e.g., Noe, 2010; Philips, 1999). A 
recommendation by a donor from different work and cultural context is implementable to 
recipient’s workplace only when it considers the local process and reward system. 
Culture of competitions among colleagues, evaluations for and feedbacks to the progress 
efforts and individual performance, and participation of decision-making leaders to these 
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continuous efforts that surround individual civil servants will serve as fertile environments 
that facilitate the whole TA processes. These Environmental factors work as rich soil and 
precipitations for the successful transplant of imported knowledge. By putting the 
components together systematically, the total impact of the TA activities should be greatly 
enhanced. 
In conclusion, a successful TA should include the careful selection of the field based on the 
needs of the recipient, design of training programs aiming for the development of the 
capability (or cognitive potentials) and incentive systems for the motivation of individuals, 
and evaluation and feedback of the entire efforts including transfer-friendly environment 
factors. This series of activities depicted as the Figure 2 below advances cyclically so that this 
ecological system evolves and grows in the long run.  
 
<Figure 2: A Systems Approach to Impact-Oriented TA> 
 
 
 
 
4. Case Study: Capacity Building Program for Indonesian Government 
 
This KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) program was designed to support 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy reform through training and consultation. The first phase of the 
program lasted July 2007 ~ July 2008, and the second phase program was launched in August 
2009 with two year duration, exceptional to one year convention. The second phase was 
assigned to the same experts led by Korea Productivity Center (KPC). Committed to 
maximize the impact of the program, the re-grouped consultants planned this 2-year program 
in a more strategic way. This program is differentiated in that it emphasized the motivation of 
both the recipient country and the experts, and that both providing motivation and capacity 
building for the recipient is conducted in a tailor-made way for 12 participating Indonesian 
organizations. Therefore, the program in this section refers to the second phase one unless 
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specified. The following table epitomizes the success factors of the program which will be 
explained in this section.  
 
<Table 5: Summary of Success Factors > 
 
 Strengthen Motivation Build Capacity 
Recipient: 
Indonesia 
-Monitoring and evaluation on the 
recipient’s participation  
-Provide incentives for the evaluation result 
-Tailored target-setting for different level 
of organizational potential 
-Joint efforts with the recipient country’s 
reform driver (MENPAN) 
-Enhance the awareness of each Ministry by 
inviting the high rankers 
-Presidential agreement 
-Tailored action plan formulation by 
each organization 
-Tailored training and consultation for 
each stage of action plan  
 
Experts: 
Korea 
-Formal evaluation by KOICA and peer 
pressure among team members  
-Accountability and sense of program 
ownership of the experts  
-Possibility for publication as a result of the 
consultation  
-Forced initial HR investment of experts on 
Indonesian governance 
-Relatively long duration of the program 
-Right selection of fields of expertise 
and corresponding experts 
-Hire a staff working in the partner 
organization, MENPAN 
 
 
4.1 Strategies for Recipient  
 
Tailor-made Capacity building  
 
Building recipient country’s capacity is of course the imminent objective of any TA. Unlike 
the previous programs, however, capacity building was designed to be completely tailor-
made to each organization. First, the Korean experts adopted learning-by-doing approach, in 
which each participating organization of Indonesia was asked to select around 20 reform 
agenda and to formulate their action plans based on 8 modules shown in the appendix during 
the first year of the program. These action plans were major target and material of all the 
training and consultation throughout the program. As the following table 6 shows, two rounds 
of invited training in Korea and 6 consultations were designed to help formulate, implement, 
and evaluate action plans. Through this learning-by-doing approach, the experts tried to 
strengthen each organization’s overall capacity for reform itself, and to develop organization-
specific reform plans not just general ones.  
 
<Table 6: Schedule of the 2nd phase Program> 
 
Year when Training in Korea Consultation in Indonesia 
1st 
year 
Fall 
2009 
How to find reform agenda  
- Problems in Indonesian gov 
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- Korea’s best practice 
January 
2010 
 Identify reform agenda 
How to formulate action plan 
May  Finalize reform agenda 
Pre-assessment on the action plans 
July  Evaluation of action plans 
Selection of 5 better performers 
2nd 
year 
Fall How to implement the plan 
- How to make consensus 
- How to overcome obstacles 
 
January 
2011 
 Progress check for implementation 
Identify obstacles and solutions 
April  Pre-assessment on the 5 better performers 
Select candidate best practice in each org. 
Ways to improve the best practice 
July  Final evaluation: organization level  
and best practice level 
 
Second, the training and consultation was very much tailor-made to each stage. As table 6 
shows, the training of the first year aims to selecting the reform agenda of each organization 
whereas the one in the second year focuses on how to implement the action plan. Six rounds 
of consultation in Indonesia were also very much tailor-made because they were targeting the 
action plans that each organization had formulated. During the first year, the goal of the 
consultation was to assist the Indonesian organizations to select the reform agenda and to 
formulate action plan for each agenda. In the second year, however, the focus of the 
consultation was implementation of the plan, and creation of best practice.  
 
Motivation for active participation  
 
Providing a tailor-made training and consultation is worthless unless it is actively utilized by 
the recipient. The program is designed to encourage recipients’ motivation to actively 
participate in the program and implement the consultation provided by the experts.  
 
First, monitoring and evaluation on the recipient’s participation and consequential reward 
was an integral part of the program. Twelve participating organizations were evaluated twice. 
The first evaluation was about the selection of the right reform agenda and their action plans, 
whereas the second one was on the implementation of the action plan. Based on the 
evaluation, a consequential reward was provided as the following table shows.8 
 
<Table 7: Comparison of Two evaluations> 
 
 
8 The reward for the final evaluation on implementation was only a publicity which could be enjoyed only by the best 
innovator among 12 organizations. The eagerness and consequent cooperation by each organization was seriously dwindled 
at the final evaluation on implementation in 2011 compared to the first evaluation in 2010. The reduced energy was even 
more noticeable among 7 organizations which had no shot for the best innovator. The expert team should have prepared a 
more compelling reward such as wrap-up training session in Korea for those who have shown efforts till the end of the 
program. 
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 First evaluation July 2010 
Second evaluation 
July 2011 
What to 
evaluate 
Action plans  
for each reform agenda 
Implementation of action plan 
(Organizational innovation level, 
Best practices for each organization) 
Result 5 orgs with better action plans  7 other organizations 
1 best innovator / 4 innovator  
7 best practices 
Reward More training seats  for 5 organizations Publicity for the best innovator 
 
Second, even the motivation was given in a tailor-made way based on the potential that each 
organization has. The experts provided heavier assignment to the 5 better performing 
organizations, and lighter tasks to 7 with less potential which were asked to focus their 
energy to 2~3 candidate best practices since they did not seem to have enough of 
organizational capacity to pursue all 20 action plans.  
 
<Table 8: Different target and reward for different groups> 
 
 5 better performers 7 other organizations 
# of action plans to be 
consulted by experts All action plans (around 20) 
2~3 candidates for 
best practices 
Target of  
final evaluation 
Organizational innovation capacity and 
Best practices 
Best practices, 1 collected 
from each organization 
Award at the final 
conference 
Organizational level: 
Innovator Award* 
Case level: 
Innovation award 
* Best Innovator Award is conferred upon Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the best of the five whereas each of 
the rest 4 receives innovator award. 
 
Third, the program took advantage of the recipient country’s reform driving structure, so 
called grand-design of bureaucracy reform, led mainly by MENPAN, the partner organization 
in Indonesia. Since MENPAN had been in charge of a screening process of granting higher 
remuneration, all participating organizations had to be cooperative to this program jointly 
conducted with MENPAN and KOICA hoping that the result of the program may help them 
pass MENPAN’s screening process. In order to emphasize this possibility, the evaluation was 
also jointly made between MENPAN and experts.9 
 
Fourth, the consulting team tried to enhance the awareness of each Ministry by inviting the 
high ranking officials in each participating organization at the early stage of the program. 
There happened to be a positive correlation between the level of attention to this program of 
the high ranking officials in each organization and the result of the evaluation.  
 
Along with the above mentioned three success factors deliberately designed by the consulting 
team, the importance of the political environment cannot be under-estimated. Series of 
 
9 However, the program could have been more officially integrated into the Indonesia’s Grand Design of Bureaucracy 
Reform. Of course, there is an obvious limitation in the role of the consultant. However, if the donor and the recipient could 
have agreed upon a more significant involvement in the reform process of Indonesia, the program must have exhibited a 
more meaningful impact. 
14 
 
Presidential agreement between two countries generated a strong commitment of 
participating organizations in Indonesia.10 Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s win in the July 
2009 election right before the program also provided a very good political environment for 
government reform which was expected to be driven roundly by the second term President. 
This suggests that TA on public governance should be conducted under politically favorable 
condition, which is generally at the beginning of President’s term. 
 
4.2 Strategies for Experts 
 
Well-selected expertise  
 
Selection of the right expertise that meets recipient country’s need is the first step for the 
success. As major fields of expertise, the KPC selected 8 domains in the appendix 1 based on 
the survey for Indonesian civil servants. The general competency that experts are 
recommended to have was explained by Watson, Thong, and Zinke (2007). 
 
The chemistry among expert members was also an important selection factor. They spent 
around a month and a half together in Jakarta each year during the program, and they would 
not have been so enthusiastic about the program if their working and personal connection was 
not so smooth. The role of a local staff hired by the donor deserves some attention too. Her 
role was more effective since the Indonesian partner, MENPAN allows a space for her in the 
Ministry. She played an important role in sending messages, compiling reports from 12 
organizations, coordinating meeting schedule, translating Bahasa Indonesia to/from English 
when necessary. 
 
 
Motivation of experts for devotion 
 
For a locally applicable consulting product, motivation of experts is as important as their 
capacity since experts selected by donors generally have insufficient knowledge on the 
recipient country compared to their rich expertise on their research field. Documented 
information in English is rather limited, which is more so without full-hearted cooperation of 
the recipient. Unfortunately, the experts do not have a strong incentive to make an initial 
human capital investment in accumulating knowledge specific to the recipient country since 
such knowledge most likely will not be utilized again once the program is over. This is why 
many outputs of TA carry very weak local applicability. There should be a strong role of the 
donor organization to bring out and orchestrate the motivation of experts to make an initial 
HR investment on the recipient country as was in this program by KOICA and KPC.  
 
First, there were two official evaluations by KOICA, one interim11 and the other final, which 
worked as a burden for the experts. In order to maximize the accountability of the expert 
 
10 When President ROH, Moo-Hyun visited President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in December 2006, they agreed on the 
capacity building program for Indonesian government. The discussion for the second phase was accelerated by the official 
visit of President LEE, Myung-Bak to Indonesia on March 2009 who also vowed a TA on the governance field. 
11 To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the project, KOICA dispatched an interim evaluation team to Indonesia 
July 2010. They did face-to-face in-depth Interview, survey, and observation. The following is the summary of the survey. (1) 
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team, a wide spectrum of devolution to the team is critical in a wholesale way from the 
beginning till the end. This arrangement reinforced the ownership of the experts over the 
program which made them more sensitive to the evaluation result. Another critical yet 
implicit evaluation came from a peer pressure. The expert members should cooperate closely 
but at the same time give a constant pressure each other to maintain a quality work. One 
important factor to make this peer pressure present is to make the project manager (PM) free 
from the actual consultation burden so that he can focus on the managing role.  
 
Second, since the program lasted two years, longer than the ordinary one year, the experts 
had a stronger motivation to build their expertise on Indonesia’s governance. Under one year 
program, it will be difficult to expect consultants to make an initial investment since the 
investment recovery period is not long enough. This extended duration had also a by-product, 
the human touch between the experts and the Indonesian civil servants, which also 
strengthened the motivation of experts because they tried to do their best to maintain their 
reputation and friendship.  
 
Third, the consultants had to stay in an Indonesian organization for a whole month during the 
first phase of the program. This forced initial human capital investment turned out to be very 
effective in bringing out motivation of experts because the experts not only became more 
capable but also more motivated to produce better output since they earned a potential to 
become experts in Indonesian governance. This forced initial investment was not planned 
initially at the beginning of the first phase program in 2007, but turned out to be very 
effective. 
 
Encouraged by the fore-mentioned motivation, the Korean experts organized and actively 
participated in the Study Group on Indonesian Public Administration under Korea 
Association for Public Administration (KAPA). Through formal and informal seminar 
gathering, the experts have developed their expertise on Indonesian governance. Based on the 
knowledge on Indonesia acquired through the program, the experts published a book jointly 
with Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia. When the result of the TA can be utilized by the 
experts in producing research publication, the motivation of the experts who are mostly in the 
academia, will be significantly enforced.  
 
 
5. Guidelines for a Donor Agency 
Based on analysis on current TA of Korea, lessons from education theory and a case study, 
this section suggests guidelines for successful TA based on motivation and capacity of both 
recipient and donor countries. 
5.1 Recipients’ Motivation and Capacity  
 
All participants are actively engaged in the project and about 20-30% of their work time is allocated for this project. (2) 
Action planning and its implementation is the first priority work in their work schedule. (3) When they started, they didn’t 
thought they need reform but as the project progressed, they were highly motivated that they need to reform. (4) Most 
leaders in each institution actively supported the project and action plans developed by their action plan team. (5) All 
participating institution believes the project is very helpful for their bureaucratic reform. 
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Provide practical incentives  
Resistance to the newness of ideas, people and culture is common in every civil service. How 
to induce a participating institution and its civil servants to active involvement is critical for 
the success of TA. Voluntary involvement through self-recognition or persuasion can be most 
effective. Yet this is hard to expect in a developing countries where a motivation scheme is 
not properly in place. Therefore, deploying practical incentives for participating civil servants 
is an integral element as a means of increasing their motivation. Selecting best performers at 
individual, unit and institution levels and awarding them with right incentives are of very 
necessity.  
Incentives such as overseas training chances and recognition can be offered by the donor 
agency and/or the recipient government. However, for incentives such as promotion and 
better placement, it should be arranged on a basis of an agreement with a partner government 
at the onset of signing TA. Another condition for an effective incentive scheme is a fair, 
objective, and transparent process of selecting best performers. Although experts can lead the 
selection process, it might be better if the selection process is carried out in cooperation with 
a partner institution of the recipient country which has right authority. 
A partner institution and civil servants should be involved in a wide range of program-related 
activities: identify problems, develop and implement action plans, and monitor and evaluate 
the progress of action plans. While this active involvement allows a partner institution to 
build its ownership and to strengthen its empowerment during the entire process of TA, it 
does not necessarily mean that the diminishing roles of experts. Experts have to observe and 
consult on whether such involvement or empowerment is adequately exercised. The incentive 
will make more sense when the participating individual and institutions are fully committed 
to the program by active involvement. 
 
Respect the recipient’s system 
The recommendation of the donor should be compatible with existing institutional 
arrangements of a recipient country. For example, if a donor agency wants to sell a long-term 
economic development planning strategy, the partner country cannot buy it when its national 
economic development plan has already started. Rather than suggesting a totally new 
mechanism in which the consultation output can work best, experts needs to respect an 
incumbent system, though it may not fully satisfactory, if it can facilitate adoption of the 
experts’ idea. 
TA can be more effectively implemented if it utilizes the organizational system and human 
resources of a partner institution. Even when a TA program needs a new unit or taskforce that 
is responsible for the program in a partner organization, it must be approached carefully when 
it is subject to the law on government organization in a partner country. Also even if an 
existing organization and manpower are not fully compatible with what TA intends, it is 
better for experts to accommodate the existing situation since the attempt to change those 
whom the experts work with causes conflict more than cooperation. However, it is also very 
important to suggest transfer-friendly work environment in the consultation report. In 
summary, experts should work with the current system and people, but suggest something 
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new in the report. 
Select, train and retain right people  
The first step for a successful TA is the selection of right civil servants in participating 
organizations who are in charge of jobs and tasks in line with what a TA program pursues. In 
some cases, however, a chance to attend the training program is used as a gift rather than an 
investment. It is necessary for a partner institution to keep their jobs at least for some years 
after the TA program to fully utilize knowledge and skills that they acquire from TA. 
Occasionally, however, a partner institution changes jobs and tasks of civil servants who 
participated in training right after the program and even in the midst of the program. It is 
obvious that this job reshuffling significantly weakens the effectiveness of a TA program. To 
select, train, and retain right people, a donor agency based on an agreement of a partner 
government may consider putting this as a formal condition in the terms of reference (TOR). 
Provide tailor-made consultation and trainings  
The success of a TA program depends not only on the experts’ knowledge on the program but 
also on their understanding of the needs and contextual characteristics of a partner institution. 
One of the most common mistakes in designing and providing consultation and trainings is 
that the issues and themes are so general and theoretical that a partner institution and civil 
servants lose their interest. What partner institutions expect from experts differs from each 
other because they have their own organization culture and a strategic position within the 
government. Furthermore, the levels of readiness to accept a reform are different among 
participating organizations. Therefore, consultation and trainings need to be customized to 
incorporate the diverse interests and expectations of the recipients. One of the best 
approaches to design tailor-made consultation and training is to make a program-specific 
SWOT analysis for each partner organization, and let it formulate its own reform agenda. 
When it comes to training, dual-track matrix training is desirable. Accordingly, the contents 
and foci of training should be differentiated depending on ranking and also on the types of 
job as the following table shows. The training for higher ranking officials can offer general 
curriculum such as leadership and strategies, but for working level officials, a more 
customized contents should be provided. 
<Table 9: Suggested curriculum by dual-track matrix > 
 Working level officials High rankers 
Planning Bureau Plan formulation, monitoring, evaluation etc  
Leadership 
Strategies 
Culture change 
Personnel Bureau Performance management, performance pay etc 
Fiscal Bureau Budget, procurement, fiscal management etc 
 
5.2 Experts’ Motivation and Capacity 
Motivate experts with ownership and incentives 
A donor agency needs to provide additional incentives to encourage dedicated efforts of the 
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experts. For example, professors who seek a chance to link program activities to academic 
publication can be further motivated if a donor agency arranges a publication after the 
program is completed. Also experts will show more efforts if the expertise on the recipient 
country could be used again in the future. It is important for the donor agency to maintain a 
pool of experts on a specific country.   
Like in other government-funded projects, a TA program should be assessed properly on a 
regular basis by a donor agency. In an assessment, both the overall performance of the 
program and individual experts’ contribution should be evaluated. Although inputs of the 
program are relatively easily quantified, its outcome is hard to be quantified. Along with a 
quantitative assessment of inputs such as time spent and the number of visits to a partner 
institution, outcome can be better measured through a questionnaire survey or interviews of 
recipient civil servants. The outcome, of course, should be linked with compensation by the 
donor organization. In order to maximize the accountability as well as the sense of ownership 
of the experts, they should be empowered by the donor agency so that they may participate in 
designing and modifying, when necessary, the program. This wide-range of empowerment 
will enhance the accountability and ownership of experts to the program. 
Form a quality expert team 
There are several competence-related qualifications that participating experts need to possess. 
The most important competence is of no doubt the expertise they have in the relevant field. In 
addition, if experts have practical first-hand field experiences, it is a better combination. 
Together with TA-related competence, experts’ attitudes such as dedication to and passion 
for the program are integral for the success of TA. No matter how experts possess necessary 
knowledge and experiences, they become less useful if they take a stance of “take it or leave 
it.” This stance is one of reasons why many TA programs are turned out to be fruitless. This 
dedication will of course come from motivation of experts. When an expert team is formed, it 
is often the case that one of experts becomes a project manager (PM). However, the most 
important roles and responsibilities of the PM is to facilitate smooth coordination and 
communication among experts, a donor agency and partner institutions, and to manage the 
entire program effectively. In this regard, it would be better to exempt the PM from actual 
consultation burdens in order for him/her to spend time on effective TA management. 
There are three types of experts with distinctive strength and weakness. An optimal mix of 
their expertise is recommended while a harmonious chemistry among team members is very 
important too. 
<Table 10: Three types of Experts> 
Occupation  Type of knowledge Strong points Weakness 
Professors  Academic knowledge on the expertise area 
Abundant knowledge on 
the issue 
Local applicability of the 
recommendation 
(former) 
Civil servants  
Knowledge on the field 
experience 
First-hand experiences 
of practical cases 
Passion (motivation), 
Opportunity, Language 
Consultants  Knowledge on TA process and network 
Project manager (PM), 
Presentation skill Knowledge on the topic 
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To hire a local assistant as a member of the expert team is a good way of overcoming 
obstacles such as language barrier and geographical distance. Considering the importance of 
smooth communications and exchange of information between the donor and the recipient, 
recruiting a competent local assistance is more important than generally perceived. A local 
assistance can play multiple roles as an interpreter as well as a liaison staff. A local assistant 
can be more effectively utilized if the major partner organization respects his/her roles, and 
provides a space in its office. 
Design multi-year program and dispatch experts for enough time 
Most of TAs have comprehensive and broad goal such as capacity building or governance 
improvement which takes a long time to achieve. It would be more effective for a donor 
agency to make a multi-year contract with the recipient country rather than typical one year, 
or less-than-a-year, contract. This does not necessarily mean that experts can hold a long-
term contract. As discussed earlier, their multi-year contract should be subject to the results 
of interim performance assessment by a donor agency. The possibility of a multi-year 
contract will induce stronger commitment and motivation from the experts. 
To allow experts to get necessary knowledge, enough stay in a partner country, say for a 
month or so, is the best option. Dispatching experts for enough time gives another merit. 
Experts with a sufficient duration of stay can build strong relationships with civil servants in 
partner institutions. In addition to profound knowledge of experts, reciprocal trust between 
experts and civil servants in partner institutions on the basis of strong relationship is another 
key element of successful TA. Since a long period of stay at an early stage of the program is 
an initial investment, one will be more motivated to become a regional expert. The following 
table summarizes key factors explained in this section. 
 
<Table 11: Key Success Factors of TA> 
 Motivation Capacity 
Demand Side: 
Partner Country 
(Participating 
organizations 
and their civil  
servants) 
l Provide practical incentives for 
partner institutions and 
participants (D, M&E) 
l Utilize the existing frame of the 
partner country (D, I) 
l Utilize organization and 
manpower of partner institutions 
(D, I) 
l Empower partner institutions and 
participants with the ownership (I) 
l Select, Train and Retain Right 
People (D, I, M&E) 
l Provide tailor-made consultation 
and program-specific trainings to 
partner institutions (D, I) 
l Provide rank- and job-specific 
trainings (D, I) 
Supply Side: 
Donor Country 
(Aid Agency and  
Experts) 
l Select and compose quality 
experts for TA (D) 
l Empower experts with the 
ownership (I) 
l Provide adequate and extra 
incentives for experts (D, M&E) 
l Execute program evaluations with 
rewards (M&E) 
l Design mid- or long-term 
consultation rather than short-term 
consultation (D, M&E) 
l Hire and utilize local assistants 
(D, I) 
l Dispatch experts to a partner 
country for enough time (D, I) 
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Note: Bold initials in parentheses refer to the stage of a life cycle of a TA program: designing of the program (D), 
implementation of the program (I), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the program.  
 
 
6. Suggestion for Donors’ Cooperation   
 
Having unusual experiences of achieving both economic growth and political democracy, 
Korea is in a position to stage more active TA programs for developing countries. To 
maximize its impact, TA should be conducted in a way to encourage not only the capacity but 
also the motivation of both recipient and the experts, that is, TA programs should pursue the 
competency-building, not simply capacity building. 
 
These efforts will be more effective when they are collaborated and coordinated with the 
other donor countries. As a donor, there are 4 roles in the process of TA: financial support, 
program design, program implementation (consultation, training), and evaluation. Among 
many possible cooperation models, this paper would like to propose two types. First, a donor 
country can provide financial source and evaluate the outcome after the program is over, but 
utilize the experts in the other countries. Two collaborating parties, of course, can design the 
program jointly before implementation. A donor country can maximize the effectiveness of 
its TA by employing the most suitable group of foreign experts.  
 
Second, a donor country can let the foreign organization, not the donor agency, to conduct the 
evaluation on the expert team that has implemented the TA program. Though most of 
programs can be evaluated by the donor agency, evaluations on important programs with big 
scale of which outcome the donor agency cannot be free from could be commissioned to the 
foreign organization for a more objective perspective.  
 
Finally, the donor agency should be assessed as well in terms of TA management or its 
management capacity. A donor agency is not simply a distributor of aid funds, rather, it is an 
ultimate manager of TA program. Therefore, the agency should possess sufficient expertise in 
designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating TA programs. Donor agency’s 
competent involvement with strong ownership of the program is crucial for ensuring the 
effectiveness of TA. Of course, it will be the role of the government that provides proper 
consequences based on the result of the evaluation on the ODA agency.  
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Appendix Table  
 
<Eight Modules used in Capacity Building Program for Indonesian Government> 
Modules Suggested Reform agenda 
Strategies for Reform 
Strategic planning  
Leadership & Driving force for reform 
Change Management for reform 
Personnel 
Management 
Recruitment 
Placement / Rotation  
Advancement / Promotion  
Performance 
Management 
Improving Job Appraisal 
Linking Performance with Pay and Promotion 
Establishing Organizational Performance System 
Organizational 
Management/  
e-government 
Organizational Diagnosis System 
Restructuring and Reorganization 
Business Process Reengineering 
Anti-Corruption 
Transparency 
Transparency and Simplification of Business Process 
Ethics of Employees 
Internal Audit and Monitoring 
23 
 
Regulatory Reform 
Procurement and Budget Expenditure Regulation Reform 
Regulation Reform on Business Process 
Intra & Inter Business Unit Coordination 
Reform in HRD 
Function 
Proprietary Competency Modeling Procedure for Indonesian Gov't 
Proprietary Instructional Systems Design Model 
Development of HRD Specialists 
Gov't Reform through 
HRD Function 
Roadmap for Developing the Indonesian Gov't Competency Model 
Reform Gov't Officials Leadership Development Curriculum 
Development of HRD ROI(Rate on Investment) Evaluation 
 
